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From: Justice O'Connor · 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST4TES 
No. 83-1330 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
THOMAS J. HENSLEY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1984] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari in this case,-- U. S. -- (1984), 
to determine whether police officers may stop and briefly de-
tain a person who is the subject of a "wanted flyer" while 
they attempt to find out whether an arrest warrant has been 
issued. We conclude that such stops are consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment under appropriate circumstances. 
I 
On December 4, 1981, two armed men robbed a tavern in 
the Cincinnati suburb of St. Bernard, Ohio. Six days later, a 
St. Bernard police officer, Kenneth Davis, interviewed an in-
formant who passed along information that respondent 
Thomas Hensley had driven the getaway car during the 
armed robbery. Officer Davis obtained a written statement 
from the informant and immediately issued a "wanted flyer" 
to other police departments in the Cincinnati metropolitan 
area. 
The flyer twice stated that Hensley was wanted for in-
vestigation of an aggravated robbery. It described both 
Hensley and the date and location of the alleged robbery, and 
asked other departments to pick up and hold Hensley for the 
St. Bernard police in the event he were located. The flyer 
also warned other departments to use caution and to consider 
Hensley armed and dangerous. 
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The St. Bernard Police Department's "wanted flyer" was 
received by teletype in the headquarters of the Covington 
Police Department on December 10, 1981. Covington is a 
Kentucky suburb of Cincinnati that is approximately five 
miles from St. Bernard. The flyer was read aloud at each 
change of shift in the Covington Police Department between 
December 10 and December 16, 1981. Some of the Coving-
ton officers were acquainted with Hensley, and after Decem-
ber 10 they periodically looked for him at places in Covington 
he was known to frequent. 
On December 16, 1981, Covington Officer Terrence Eger 
saw a white Cadillac convertible stopped in the middle of a 
Covington street. Officer Eger saw Hensley in the driver's 
seat and asked him to move on. As Hensley drove away, 
Eger inquired by radio whether there was a warrant out-
standing for Hensley's arrest. Before the dispatcher could 
answer, two other Covington officers who were in separate 
cars on patrol interrupted to say that there might be an Ohio 
robbery warrant outstanding on Hensley. The officers, 
Daniel Cope and David Raasche, subsequently testified that 
they had heard or read the St. Bernard flyer on several occa-
sions, that they recalled that the flyer sought a stop for inves-
tigation only, and that in their experience the issuance of 
such a flyer was usually followed by the issuance of arrest 
warrant. While the dispatcher checked to see whether a 
warrant had been issued, Officer Cope drove to a Holman 
Street address where Hensley occasionally stayed, and Offi-
cer Raasche went to check a second location. 
The dispatcher had difficulty in confirming whether a war-
rant had been issued. Unable to locate the flyer, she called 
the Cincinnati Police Department on the mistaken belief that 
the flyer had originated in Cincinnati. The Cincinnati Police 
Department transferred the call to its records department, 
which placed the dispatcher on hold. In the meantime, Offi-
cer Cope reported that he had sighted a white Cadillac ap-
proaching him on Holman Street. Cope turned on his flash-
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ing lights and Hensley pulled over to the curb. Before Cope 
left his patrol car, the dispatcher advised him that she had 
"Cincinnati hunting for the warrant," App. 49, but that she 
had not yet confirmed it. Cope approached Hensley's car 
with his service revolver drawn and pointed into the air. He 
had Hensley and a passenger seated next to him step out of 
the car. 
Moments later, Officer Raasche arrived in his separate car. 
He recognized the passenger, Albert Green, a convicted 
felon. Raasche stepped up to the open passenger door of 
Hensley's car and observed the butt of a revolver protruding 
from the underneath the passenger's seat. Green was then 
arrested. A search of the car uncovered a second handgun 
wrapped in a jacket in the middle of the front seat and a third 
handgun in a bag in the back seat. After the discovery of 
these weapons, Hensley was also arrested. 
After state handgun possession charges against Hensley 
were dismissed, Hensley was indicted by a federal grand jury 
in the Eastern District of Kentucky for being a convicted 
felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U. S. C. App. 
§ 1202(a)(1). Hensley moved to suppress the handguns from 
evidence on the grounds that Covington police had impermis-
sibly stopped him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 
the principles announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). 
The District Judge held the stop to be proper and denied the 
motion. Res~ondent was convicted after a bench trial and 
sentenced to two years in federal prison. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
reversed the conviction. 713 F. 2d 220 (1983). The panel 
noted that the Covington police could not justifiably conclude 
from the St. Bernard flyer that a warrant had been issued for 
Hensley's arrest; nor could the Covington police stop the re-
spondent while they attempted to find out whether a warrant 
had in fact been issued. Reviewing this Court's decisions 
applying Terry, the Sixth Circuit concluded that investiga-
tive stops remain a narrow exception to the probable cause 
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requirement, and that this Court has manifested a "clear in-
tention to restrict investigative stops to settings involving 
the investigation of ongoing crimes." I d., at 225. Since 
Covington police encountered Hensley almost two weeks 
after the armed robbery in St. Bernard, they had no reason 
to believe they were investigating an ongoing crime. Be-
cause the Covington police were familiar only with the St. 
Bernard flyer, and not with the specific information which led 
the St. Bernard police to issue the flyer, the Court of Appeals 
held they lacked a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an 
investigative stop. The Court of Appeals concluded that 
Hensley's conviction rested on evidence obtained through an 
illegal arrest, and therefore had to be reversed. We dis-
agree, and now reverse. 
II 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Terry, 
supra, and subsequent cases, this Court has held that, con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment, police may stop persons 
in the absence of probable cause under limited circumstances. 
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 207-211 (1979). 
In particular, the Court has noted that law enforcement 
agents may briefly stop a moving automobile to investigate a 
reasonable suspicion that its occupants are involved in crimi-
nal activity. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U. S. 873, 881 (1974) <}Vithin United States borders, govern- fe 
ment interest in preventing illegal entry of aliens permits 
Terry stop on reasonable suspicion that particular vehicle 
contains aliens). Although stopping a car and detaining its 
occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, the governmental interest in investigat-
ing an officer's reasonable suspicion, based on specific and 
articulable facts, may outweigh the Fourth Amendment in-
terest of the driver and passengers in remaining secure from 
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the intrusion. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 
653-655 (1979). 
In this case, the Sixth Circuit announced two prerequisites 
to such an investigatory stop and held that they were lacking: 
first, the crime being investigated was not imminent or ongo-
ing, but rather was already completed; second, the "wanted 
flyer" was insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that 
respondent had engaged in criminal activity. If either part ;1 
of this an~sis is correct, then it was indeed improper to stop -::: JG:; 
respondent, and his conviction cannot stand. We accord-
ingly turn to the separate but related issues of Terry stops to 
investigate completed crimes and Terry stops in reliance on 
another police department's "wanted flyer." 
A 
This is the first case we have addressed in which police 
stopped a person because they suspected he was involved in a 
completed crime. In our previous decisions involving inves-
tigatory stops on less than probable cause, police stopped or 
seized a person because they suspected he was about to com-
mit a crime, e. g. Terry, supra, or was committing a crime at 
the moment of the stop, e. g. Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 
143 (1972). Noting that Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 
(1983), struck down a particularly intrusive detention of a 
person suspected of committing an ongoing crime, the Court 
of Appeals in ~his case concluded that we clearly intended to 
restrict investigative stops to the context of ongoing crimes. 
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that our prior 
opinions contemplate an inflexible rule that precludes police 
from stopping persons they suspect of past criminal activity 
unless they have probable cause for arrest. To the extent 
previous opinions have addressed the issue at all, they have 
suggested that some investigative stops based on a reason-
able suspicion of past criminal activity could withstand 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Thus United States v. Cortez, 
449 U. S. 411, 417 n. 2 (1981), indicates in a footnote that 
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"[o]f course, an officer may stop and question a person if 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that person is 
wanted for past criminal conduct." And in United States v. 
Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), decided barely a month before 
the Sixth Circuit's opinion, this Court stated that its prior 
opinions acknowledged police authority to stop a person 
"when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity." ld., at-- (emphasis added). See also Michi-
gan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 699 n. 7 (1981). Indeed, 
Florida v. Royer itself suggests that certain seizures are jus-
tifiable under the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of 
probable cause "if there is articulable suspicion that a person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime." Supra, at 498 
(plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
At the least, these dicta sugges~ that the police are not 
automatically shorn of authority to stop a suspect in the ab-
sence of probable cause merely because the criminal has com-
pleted his crime and escaped from the scene. The precise 
limits on investigatory stops to investigate past criminal ac-
tivity are more difficult to define. The proper way to 
identify the limits is to apply the same test already used to 
identify the proper bounds of intrusions that further 
investigations of imminent or ongoing crimes. That test, 
which is grounded in the standard of reasonableness embod-
ied in the Fourth Amendment, balances the nature and qual-
ity of the intrusion on personal security against the impor-
tance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion. United States v. Place, supra, at--; Michigan 
v. Summers, supra, at 698-701. When this balancing test is 
applied to stops to investigate past crimes, we think that 
probable cause to arrest need not always be required. 
The factors in the balance may be somewhat different 
when a stop to investigate past criminal activity is involved 
rather than a stop to investigate ongoing criminal conduct. 
This is because the governmental interests and the nature of 
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the intrusions involved in the two situations may differ. As 
we noted in Terry, one general interest present in the con-
text of ongoing or imminent criminal activity is "that of effec-
tive crime prevention and detection." Terry, supra, at 22. 
A stop to investigate an already completed crime does not 
necessarily promote the interest of crime prevention as di-
rectly as a stop to investigate suspected ongoing criminal ac-
tivity. Similarly, the exigent circumstances which require a 
police officer to step in before a crime is committed or com-
pleted are not necessarily as pressing long afterwards. Pub-
lic safety may be less threatened by a suspect in a past crime 
who now appears to be going about his lawful business than it 
is by a suspect who is currently in the process of violating the 
law. Finally, officers making a stop to investigate past 
crimes may have a wider range of opportunity to choose the 
time and circumstances of the stop. See Broum v. Texas, 
443 U. S. 47, 51 (1979); Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure 12 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975). 
Despite these differences, where police have been unable 
to locate a person suspected of involvement in a past crime, 
the ability to briefly stop that person, ask questions, or check 
identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the 
strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing of-
fenders to justice. Restraining police action until after prob-
able cause is obtained would not only hinder the investiga-
tion, but might also enable the suspect to flee in the interim 
and to remain at large. Particularly in the context of felo-
nies or crimes involving a threat to public safety, it is in the 
public interest that the crime be solved and the suspect de-
tained as promptly as possible. The law enforcement inter-
ests at stake in these circumstances outweigh the individual's 
interest to be free of a stop and detention that is no more ex-
tensive than permissible in the investigation of imminent or 
ongoing crimes. 
We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops 
to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permit-
83-1330--0PINION 
8 UNITED STATES v. HENSLEY 
ted, or whether there is a particular length of time after 
which a past crime becomes so stale that an investigative 
stop must be justified by probable cause. It is enough to say 
that, when police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in 
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter 
was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed 
felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that 
suspicion. The automatic barrier to such stops erected by 
the Court of Appeals accordingly cannot stand. 
B 
At issue in this case is a stop of a person by officers of one 
police department in reliance on a flyer issued by another de-
partment indicating that the person is wanted for investiga-
tion of a felony. The Court of Appeals concluded that "the 
Fourth Amendment does not permit police officers in one de-
partment to seize a person simply because a neighboring po-
lice department has circulated a flyer reflecting the desire to 
question that individual about some criminal investigation 
that does not involve the investigating officers or their de-
partment." 713 F. 2d, at 225. This holding apparently 
rests on the omission from the flyer of the specific and articu-
lable facts which led the first department to suspect respond-
ent's involvement in a completed crime. Ibid. 
This Court discussed a related issue in Whiteley v. War-
den, 401 U. 8:- 560 (1971). In Whiteley, a county sheriff in 
Wyoming obtained an arrest warrant for a person suspected 
of burglary. The sheriff then issued a message through a 
state-wide law enforcement radio network describing the 
suspect, his car, and the property taken. At least one ver-
sion of the message also indicated that a warrant had been 
issued. I d., at 564 and n. 5. The message did not specify 
the evidence that gave the sheriff probable cause to believe 
the suspect had committed the breaking and entering. In 
reliance on the radio message, police in Laramie stopped the 
suspect and searched his car. The Supreme Court, in an 
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opm10n by Justice Harlan, ultimately concluded that the 
sheriff had lacked probable cause to obtain the warrant and 
that the evidence obtained during the search by the police in 
Laramie had to be excluded. In so ruling, however, the 
Court noted: 
"We do not, of course, question that the Laramie po-
lice were entitled to act on the strength of the radio bul-
letin. Certainly police officers called upon to aid other 
officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to as-
sume that the officers requesting aid offered the magis-
trate the information requisite to support an independ-
ent judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, 
however, the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise 
illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the 
decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow offi-
cers to make the arrest." I d., at 568. 
This language in Whiteley suggests that, had the sheriff 
who issued the radio bulletin possessed probable cause for ar-
rest, then the Laramie police could have properly arrested 
the defendant even though they were unaware of the specific 
facts that established probable cause. See United States v. 
Maryland, 479 F. 2d 566, 569 (CA5 1973). Thus Whiteley 
supports the proposition that, when evidence is uncovered 
during a search incident to an arrest in reliance merely on a 
flyer or bulletin, its admissibility turns on whether the offi-
cers who issued the flyer possessed probable cause to make 
the arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying on the 
flyer were themselves aware of the specific facts which led 
their colleagues to seek their assistance. In an era when 
criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and increasingly 
likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries, this rule is a 
matter of common sense: it minimizes the volume of informa-
tion concerning suspects that must be transmitted to other 
jurisdictions and enables police in one jurisdiction to act 
promptly in reliance on information from another 
jurisdiction. 
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Neither respondent nor the Court of Appeals suggest any 
reason why a police department should be able to act on the 
basis of a flyer indicating that another department has a war-
rant, but should not be able to act on the basis of a flyer indi-
cating that another department has a reasonable suspicion of 
involvement with a crime. Faced with this precise issue, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Whiteley and 
concluded that, although the officer who issues a wanted bul-
letin must have a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a 
stop, the officer who acts in reliance on the bulletin is not 
required to have personal knowledge of the evidence creating 
a reasonable suspicion. United States v. Robinson, 536 F. 
2d 1298, 1300 (1976). The Ninth Circuit there noted "that 
effective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police 
officers can act on directions and information transmitted by 
one officer to another and that officers, who must often act 
swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow offi-
cers about the foundation for the transmitted information." 
/d., at 1299. 
It could be argued that police can more justifiably rely on a 
report that a magistrate has issued a warrant than on a re-
port that another law enforcement agency has simply con-
cluded that it has a reasonable suspicion sufficient to author-
ize an investigatory stop. We do not find this distinction 
significant. The law enforcement interests promoted by al-
lowing one department to make investigatory stops based 
upon another department's bulletins or flyers are consider-
able, while the intrusion on personal security is minimal. 
The same interests that weigh in favor of permitting police to 
make a Terry stop to investigate a past crime, supra, at--, 
support permitting police in other jurisdictions to rely on fly-
ers or bulletins in making stops to investigate past crimes. 
We conclude that, if an objective reading of a flyer or bulle-
tin would lead an experienced law enforcement officer to con-
clude that a person is wanted for questioning or for arrest in 
another jurisdiction, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin 
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justifies a stop to check identification, see United States ex 
rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F. 2d 397, 400-401 (CA 7) (STE-
VENS, J.), cert. en 421 U. S. 1016 (1975), to pose questions r om {:;e.cf 
to the person, or to etain the person briefly while attempt-
ing to obtain further information. See Adams v. Williams, 
407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972) ("A brief stop of a suspicious indi-
vidual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the 
status quo momentarily while obtaining other information, 
may be the most reasonable in the light of the facts known to 
the officer at the time"). It is the objective reading of the 
flyer or bulletin that determines whether other police officers 
are entitled to act in reliance upon it. Cf. Terry, supra, at 
21-22 (" ... it is imperative that the facts be judged against 
an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer 
at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was ap-
propriate?"). In addition, we hold that, assuming the police 
make a Terry stop in justifiable reliance on a flyer or bulletin, 
the evidence uncovered in the course of such a stop is admis-
sible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a 
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop, United States v. 
Robinson, supra, and if the stop that in fact occurred was not 
significantly more intrusive than would have been permitted 
the issuing department. 
III 
It remains to apply the two sets of principles described 
above to the stop and subsequent arrest of respondent 
Hensley. 
At the outset, we assume arguendo that the St. Bernard 
police who issued the "wanted flyer" on Hensley lacked prob-
able cause for his arrest. The District Court implied that 
the St. Bernard police had probable cause for arrest, but held 
only that the St. Bernard officers had reasonable suspicion 
sufficient to justify a stop. Crim No. 82-29 (ED Ky., Octo-
ber 19, 1982). The Court of Appeals implied that probable 
cause might be lacking, 713 F. 2d, at 223, but ultimately con-
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eluded that the question was irrelevant because the Coving-
ton police would not be entitled to make an arrest or a stop 
regardless of whether the St. Bernard police possessed prob-
able cause or a reasonable suspicion. In this Court, no party 
contends that the St. Bernard police had probable cause to 
arrest Hensley. 
We agree with the District Court that the St. Bernard po-
lice possessed a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and 
articulable facts, that Hensley was involved in an armed rob-
bery. The District Judge heard testimony from the St. Ber-
nard officer who interv~ewed the informer. On the strength 
of the evidence, the District Court concluded that the wealth 
of detail concerning the robbery revealed by the informer, 
coupled with her admission of tangential participation in the 
robbery, established that the informer was sufficiently reli-
able and credible "to arouse a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity by [Hensley] and to constitute the specific and articu-
lable facts needed to underly a stop." Crim No. 82-29 (ED 
Ky., October 19, 1982). Under the circumstances, "the in-
formation carried enough indicia of reliability," Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972), to justify an investiga-
tory stop of Hensley. 
The justification for a stop did not evaporate when the 
armed robbery was completed. Hensley was reasonably 
suspected of involvement in a felony and was at large from 
the time the suspicion arose until the stop by the Covington 
police. A brief stop and detention at the earliest opportu-
nity after the suspicion arose is fully consistent with the prin-
ciples of the Fourth Amendment. 
Turning to the flyer issued by the St. Bernard police, we 
believe it satisfies the objective test announced today. An 
objective reading of the entire flyer would lead an experi-
enced officer to conclude that Thomas Hensley was at least 
wanted for questioning and investigation in St. Bernard. 
That alone would justify a brief stop to check Hensley's iden-
tification, pose questions, and inform the suspect that the St. 
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Bernard police wished to question him. As an experienced 
officer could well assume that a warrant might have been ob-
tained in the period after the flyer was issued, we think the 
flyer would further justify a brief detention at the scene of 
the stop while officers checked whether a warrant had in fact 
been issued. It is irrelevant whether the Covington officers 
intended to detain Hensley only long enough to confirm the 
existence of a warrant, or for some longer period; what mat-
ters is that the stop and detention that occurred were in fact 
no more intrusive than would have been permitted an experi-
enced officer on an objective reading of the flyer. 
To be sure, the St. Bernard flyer at issue did not request 
that other police departments briefly detain Hensley merely 
to check his identification or confirm the existence of a war-
rant. Instead, it asked other departments to pick up and 
hold Hensley for St. Bernard. Our decision today does not 
suggest that such a detention, whether at the scene or at the 
Covington police headquarters, would have been justified. 
Given the distance involved and the time required to identify 
and communicate with the department that issued the flyer, 
such a detention might well be so lengthy or intrusive as to 
exceed the permissible limits of a Terry stop. See United 
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696,-- (1983). Nor do we mean 
to endorse St. Bernard's request in its flyer for actions that 
could forseeably violate the Fourth Amendment. We hold 
only that this flyer, objectively read, justified the length and 
intrusiveness of the stop and detention that actually 
occurred. 
When the Covington officers stopped Hensley, they were 
authorized to take such steps as were reasonably necessary 
to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status 
quo during the course of the stop. The Covington officers' 
conduct was well within the permissible range in the context 
of suspects who are reported to be armed and dangerous. 
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. --, ---- (1983); 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 110-111 (1977) (per 
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curiam). Having stopped Hensley, the Covington police 
were entitled to seize evidence revealed in plain view in the 
course of the lawful stop, to arrest Hensley's passenger when 
evidence discovered in plain view gave probable cause to be-
lieve the passenger had committed a crime, Texas v. Brown, 
460 U. S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion), and subsequently to 
search the passenger compartment of the car because it was 
within the passenger's immediate control. New York v. 
Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981). Finally, having discovered ad-
ditional weapons in Hensley's car during the course of a law-
ful search, the Covington officers had probable cause to ar-
rest Hensley himself for possession of firearms. 
The length of Hensley's detention from his stop to his ar-
rest on probable cause was brief. A reasonable suspicion on 
the part of the St. Bernard police underlies and supports 
their issuance of the flyer. Finally, the stop that occurred 
was reasonable in objective reliance on the flyer and was not 
significantly more intrusive than would have been permitted 
the St. Bernard police. Under these circumstances, the in-
vestigatory stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and the evidence discovered during the stop was 
admissible. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
CHA ... II!:AS or 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
•upuuu Gt&mrl of tJrt ~ttb •tatt• 
,. .. Jriqhnt. ~.at. 20~,.~ 
November 29, 1984 
Re: 83-1330 - United States v. Hensley 
Dear Sandra: 
Although I have had a good deal of difficulty with 
this case, when I read your draft opinion I found that 
I was persuaded until I came to the bottom of page 10. 
You conclude that the justification for a Terry stop 
based on another police department's flyer or bulletin 
depends on what the flyer or bulletin says, rather than 
the information in the originating police department 
that gave rise to the flyer. It would seem to me that 
the validity of the stop, like the validity of the 
arrest in Whiteley, should depend on the information 
that was available to the entire police establishment. 
I would therefore propose that the concluding paragraph 
on page 10 be revised to read something like this: 
•we conclude that, if a flyer or bulletin has 
been issued on the basis of articulable facts 
supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted 
person has committed an offense, then reliance on 
that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check 
identification." 
Subsequent portions of the op1n1on would, of 
course, have to be changed to conform to this reading. 
It seems to me most unwise for the Court to 
endorse stops that are based on totally unsupported 
flyers or bulletins simply because they appear to be 
facially valid. I would agree, of course, that an 
officer making such a stop would have a good faith 
defense to any suit based on the incorrect stop, but I 
simply cannot understand why we should conclude that 
such a stop is legitimate. Indeed, the Government's 
brief seemed to endorse •the proposition that an 
officer who receives a police bulletin has 'the same 
right' to make a stop or an arrest as the officer who 
issued the bulletin.• Brief, at 19. 
In all events, if you could see your way clear to 
recasting this part of the opinion, I would be prepared 





JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
ilu;n-ttttt <rfllUrlgf tlrt ~tb ~talts 
.. aslfittghm. ~. C4. 20~~~ 
November 30, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1330 United States v. Hensley 
Dear Sandra, 




cc: The Conference 
December 6, 1984 
83-1330 United States v. Hensley 
Dear Sandra: 
Please ioi.n me. 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
·~· ~. : 
Sincer~ly, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
~tt¥rtmt QfDUd af tqt 1htittlt .jtzdt,tr 
)lzudtin¢an, ~.<If. 2llgt~~ 
December 8, 1984 
No. 83-1330 United States v. Hensley 
Dear John, 
Since our correspondence has been circulated to 
the Conference I have heard no objection from others to 
accommodating your suggestion. I have made the suggested 
changes in the new draft circulated herewith as noted on 
pages 10, 11, and 13. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMI!IERS 01' 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
December 10, 1984 
Re: United States v. Hensley, No. 83-1330 
· Dear Sandra: 
I had originally intended to dissent in this case, 
but your persuasive opinion has largely convinced me 
otherwise. However, I am troubled by two relatively 
minor points on page 11 of the draft. First, I wonder 
about the advisability of including the two sentences on 
page 11 beginning with "If the flyer has been issued in 
the absence ••• " Neither the parties nor the lower court 
in this case addressed the issue of civil damage actions 
arising from stops like that conducted here. If any 
modification of ordinary immunity law is required to take 
account of our decision in this case (and I do not take 
your opinion to be intending such a modification), should 
we not address that issue in a case where it is squarely 
presented? Second, in the last sentence of the same 
paragraph the draft speaks of stops as legitimate if "not 
significantly more intrusive than would have been 
permitted the issuing department." I am uncomfortable 
with the idea that the second police department has any 
greater authority in these circumstances than the first 
police department and would therefore prefer that the 
word "significantly" be removed from this sentence. 
If you could make these modifications, I would be 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMB E R S OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
"nvrtnu C!fcurt .ttf l4t :Jlnift~ .Jtatt• 
~a.-Jrington. ~. Of. 2ll~_,.~ 
December 11, 1984 
No. 83-1330 United States v. Hensley 
Dear Bill, 
Thanks for your letter and suggestions. Naturally, I 
would be delighted to have your concurrence in the 
circulating opinion. The new language on page 11 was the 
result of my correspondence with John and I am reluctant to 
make additional major changes. 
I included the word "significantly" in the last 
sentence of Part II because it appeared likely that, when a 
police officer makes an investigatory stop based on a flyer 
or bulletin from another police department, the duration of 
the stop might be somewhat longer than if the stop were made 
by the department issuing the flyer. This is because the 
department receiving the flyer may require sufficient time 
to contact the issuing department to obtain any requested 
information. I would prefer to leave the language intact, 
although if it would meet your concerns I would be willing 
to delete the word "significantly" and substitute something 
along the following lines: 
"Of course, a stop made by officers in reliance on a 
wanted flyer might need to last somewhat longer than a stop 
made by the officers who issued the flyer. This is because 
the officers who rely on a flyer may need to communicate 
with the issuing department, and efforts to identify and 
contact the issuing department may require more time than it 
takes an officer in the issuing department to call his own 
headquarters." 
With respect to the language about civil liability of 
the officers making the stop, I think it is important to 
indicate in some way that officers acting in reasonable 
reliance on a flyer or bulletin from another department are 
not civilly liable for doing so. As the Solicitor General's 
brief in this case notes, police departments in the 
Cincinnati area have begun to refuse to act on flyers from 
other departments. Brief at 10, n. 8. Ambiguity about 
civil liability could cause this trend to continue, despite 
the other language in the opinion. It is well established 
that officers who act in good faith reliance on a warrant 
I ~. • .. , 
2. 
have a defense to civil suits should the warrant turn out to 
be invalid. See, e.g., Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 93 
(CAS), cert. denied, 449 u.s. 900 (1980). The opinion 
already analogizes to Whiteley, where police acted on a 
report that a warrant had been issued, to conclude that 
police can act on a flyer requesting an investigatory stop 
just as they can act on a flyer requesting execution of an 
arrest warrant. I do not think it is a modification of 
existing immunity law, or a particularly great leap of 
reasoning, to say that officers who act in good faith 
reliance on a flyer enjoy protection similar to that 
possessed by officers who act in good faith reliance on a 
warrant. I would prefer to expressly so indicate. Would it 
alleviate your concerns if the sentences were amended to 
read: 
"If the flyer has been issued in the absence of a 
reasonable suspicion, then a stop in objective reliance upon 
it violates the Fourth Amendment. In such a situation, of 
course, the officers making the stop may have a good faith 
defense to any civil suit. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 
232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 u.s. S47 (1967); Turner v. 
Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 93 (CAS), cert. denied, 449 u.s. 900 
(1980) (officer relying in good faith on an invalid arrest 
warrant has defense to civil suit). It is the objective 
reading of the flyer or bulletin that determines whether 
other police officers can defensibly act in reliance on it. 
"? . . . . 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM8ERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.. lqJUUU Clf£11trl Df tlr~ J{mttb .. tat~g 
JluJringtDn. ~. elf. 2ll.;i~~ 
December 12, 1984 
Re: 83-1330 - United States v. Hensley 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IE:RS OF" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hpt-mu <lJDUri of tlt.t ~~~taUs 
.ultinghnt. ~.<!f. 20~"'' 
December 13, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1330, United States v. Hensley 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Sin~ 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.§n.p-rtntt ~lrlttt of t!F ~nitt·~ .;§\ta±ta 
'IDctsftinghrn, ~. ~· 20?'~2 
December 18 , 1984 
Re : No . 83-1330-u.s . v . Hensley 
Dear Sandra: 





cc : The Conference 
,. 
CHAMI!IE:RS OF" 
,ju.prmu <!fonri of tlrt ~b ,ftatts 
•utrm\lhtn. Jl. <ij. 21lp,.~ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE December 21 t 1984 
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